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A large number of economic models has been developed in the past 15 years in
order to explore the causes of endogenous regional growth and the location of
economic activities with the consequent diﬀerentials of development among ter-
ritories. At the same time regional policies have undergone major modiﬁcations
with increasing importance attributed to bottom up policies and to the eﬃciency
of spending, also due to a situation in which funds are a scarce resource. These de-
velopments appear however to have taken place without paying enough attention
to the concurrent eﬀects entailed by policies implemented separately by diﬀerent
regions. In fact competing regions can implement policies which are not optimal
from an aggregate point of view. At the same time national policies designed to
reduce regional inequalities may also be sub-optimal from a country perspective.
Unfortunately, it is too often unclear under what values of the parameters regional
policies are also able to increase the aggregate economic performance of nations
or over-national communities and which policies are, instead, to be simply con-
sidered as a means to increase the equality of income across space. Therefore it is
on the one hand important to detect which regional policies belong to each of the
two categories, then to compare them with diﬀerent policies (aiming at equality
of income or at eﬃciency) to discover which ones are better suited to achieve the
needed results with lower costs. On the other hand, it is important to further in-
vestigate which policies are more fruitful if implemented in a context of regional
competition and which ones should be top-down. This article addresses the issues
presented above. First there is a revision of the existing contributions in order
to evidence the general tendencies of the existing literature, the results that can
already be considered as achieved and the deﬁciencies that limit the ability to
produce usable policy prescriptions. Then the paper analyses the relationship be-
tween regional policies and national competitiveness in a small number of selectedexisting models of regional growth and localisation, in particular with an extension
to the case of competing countries, each composed of more than one region.
31 Introduction
”In the past, the consensus was that regional policy could support growth,
and that convergence would come about by poorer regions catching up with
richer ones. Increased equality and growth could go hand in hand. Recent
experience has led a number of commentators to question this. They argue
that there are strong economic forces that lead to divergence between regions.
Regional policy cannot do much to overcome these forces. This means that
regional spending is simply a transfer of income from rich to the poor - with
little eﬀect on productivity gap in poor regions. Indeed, this may led to lower
overall prosperity if it drains resources from those wealthy innovative regions
that are the main engines of economic growth. If this is the case we face a
trade oﬀ between equality and growth”, (Maystadt, 2000, p.4).
As well emphasised by the president of the European Investment Bank,
regional policy faces a radical challenge in front of the evidence and theories
put forth by the renewed interest paid to spatial aspects by economic theory:
mainstream economists have re-entered the ﬁeld from more than a decade
and have added their insights to the recent developments of geographers
and economic geographers so that now a large number of approaches is now
available to study the eﬀects of regional policies.
At the same time, the instruments of regional policy have deeply changed
and involve a wider range of policies, with larger importance devoted to the
context, to programming and evaluation, and to indirect eﬀect which could
harm the results to be achieved. Even more important, a large part of regional
policy now employs a bottom-up approach, in terms of decision process, man-
agement, ﬁnancing and evaluation. This introduces an additional diﬃculty
to economic modelling, which is at present only partially overcome with the
aid of new techniques.
4As the paper will evidence, most economic literature still thinks about
regional policy in terms of infrastructural policy, or even more speciﬁcally, in
terms of mere transport infrastructure, which used to constitute the bunch
of many interventions until the 80s, but which already had a large number
of exceptions, like for example the policies inspired by the Perroux’s Growth
Poles theory (Darwent, 1969). The focus on infrastructure, is mainly due
to the diﬃculty of modelling complex territorial aspects, especially those
relational, but, in some cases, one could also conjecture a simpliﬁed under-
standing of regional policies; most economists, however, are now aware of the
large work that remains to be done in the ﬁeld, for example Baldwin et al.
(2003).
The scarcity of available resources, due to tighter ﬁnancial constraints,
is making more important the analysis of the eﬀects of regional policies on
the overall eﬃciency of the economic system since it becomes of paramount
importance to know if new resources become available (as in the traditional
approach that used to see regional policies as development policies) or if there
is a price in terms of eﬃciency, or aggregate income, to be paid in favour of
an increased equity between regions.
2 On the concept of Infrastructure
As already mentioned, most models focus on infrastructure but the concept
is broad and no deﬁnition is available which may be used for all purposes:
according to Biehl (1991)[p. 9] it is deﬁned as ”that part of overall stock of
national or regional economies that, because of their ’publicness’, are nor-
mally not provided by free market at all, or only ineﬃciently”; his focus is
therefore on infrastructure as capital stock and as public (or nearly public)
5good. This deﬁnition cannot always be applied, since the 90’s have experi-
enced an increasing interest in the private provision of public infrastructure
as a instrument to obtain economic eﬃciency.
Gramlich (1994)[page 1177] aﬃrms that ”The deﬁnition that makes most
sense from an economic standpoints consists of large capital intensive natural
monopolies such as highways [...] most of these systems are owned publicly
in the United States but some are owned privately” but he admits the pos-
sibility of alternative, broader, narrower deﬁnitions; this though focuses on
the natural monopoly (in general due to to economies of scale) instead of
on the public good that is ”nondepletable” (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, p. 359)
meaning that this use by an agent does not preclude the use by another
agent. Biehl (1991), particularly, extend the ’publicness’ from the mere non
excludability (that can be due either to the impossibility of deﬁning property
rights or to the fact that in practice, the mechanisms necessary to obtain the
exclusion are too costly) to include: non-substitutability, i.e. the infrastruc-
ture cannot be replaced at a low cost by another; immobility, i.e. it cannot
be moved or if it can, it is at a prohibitive cost; polyvalence, i.e. it may be
used as a production factor in many diﬀerent economic processes; indivisi-
bility. The last feature, the fact that infrastructure can usually be built only
for a determined carrying capacity and this independently of how much of
the maximum capacity will be actually utilised, can be somewhat referred
to scale economies and is the reason why many communication projects are
economically worthwhile only in the already advanced regions and do not
pay oﬀ in less developed.
Whatever the case, the deﬁnition is debatable and Button (1998), after
having recognized the importance of and the diﬃculty of achieving a good
deﬁnition, adopts the way out of treating it as ”what most people consider
6it to be” (p. 150).
The result of infrastructure investment has been econometrically calcu-
lated by a number of studies following the seminal work of Aschauer (1989)
that, using a Cobb Douglas production function, estimated the eﬀects on
aggregate productivity in the US of a number of diﬀerent types of public
capital and found that the largest explanatory power is displayed by a core
composed of streets, highways, airports, mass transit, sewers, water systems.
The value that he ﬁnds is very high, enough to make the public provision of
these factors able to increase aggregate output by more than their value and
this led to many criticisms , but other successive studies also ﬁnd high values
and the merit of Aschauer, beyond the value of the estimated parameters,
was to call attention to the fact that public capital has indeed and eﬀect on
productivity.
Traditionally, infrastructure plays two roles in economic models and em-
pirical analysis at a local level: ﬁrst it increases productivity and second it
inﬂuences competitiveness and, as a consequence, the location of industries;
both these eﬀects were supposed to be exerted in a linear and growing rela-
tion, but new evidence and new theories, developed in the last decade, now
question the linearity of this relationship. In fact, the infrastructure issue
involves a number of complications that make its analysis complex.
Following Hackfoort (1996), there are three approaches towards infras-
tructure in the empiric literature: the ﬁrst is the production function, in
which the infrastructure enters as a factor along with labour and private
capital; the second is the proﬁt function approach, in which what is calcu-
lated is the inﬂuence of infrastructure on the ﬁrms’ proﬁts; the third is the
cost function that attempts to measure the impact of infrastructure on the
costs of producers; because of the microeconomic property of duality, the
7two last should give, in theory, the same results. The eﬀect of infrastructure
on costs depends on the nature of its relationship with the other produc-
tion factors: if it is of substitutability it always reduces costs but if there are
complementarities the eﬀect is undetermined.
Wickerman (1991b) (p. 37) stresses that ”although transport, like any
other infrastructure, is clearly associated with economic growth [...] it is
not unambiguously the promoter of such a growth”. It is in fact possible to
think of infrastructure as a ”facilitator” which makes possible to accomplish
some economic tasks but does not guarantee that the tasks will actually be
accomplished.
3 Desired properties of regional policies
With the introduction of models with imperfect competition (Dixit and
Stiglitz, 1977) and consequent agglomeration (Krugman, 1991a,b, Ottaviano
and Puga, 1998, Fujita et al., 1999, Neary, 2001, Fujita and Thisse, 2002)
ﬁrst the linearity of the relationship between transport costs and regional
development has been questioned, then, as a consequence, the linearity of
regional development, since an increased attention have been devoted to is-
sues such as history, the lock-in and expectations (Ottaviano, 1999, 2001,
Baldwin, 2001). It is interesting to remember that, in models with multiple
equilibria, a force that pulls the economy out of an unstable equilibrium can-
not be counterbalanced by an opposite force of the same size, this because of
cumulative eﬀects that move the system towards the stable equilibrium (or
one of the stable equilibria when there exist more than one).
We can represent the possible outcomes of multi-regional models of ag-
glomeration in a 4 quadrants graph (Fig. 1). We will have horizontally growth
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Figure 1: Classiﬁcation of equilibria of the models.
or income (depending if the model is dynamic or static), measured for the
whole country; vertically there is represented the extent of regional dispari-
ties. Both axes should actually be depicted on a continuous scale, but in the
discreet form it is easier to discuss its meaning.
When decreasing returns are present, like in exogenous growth models (Solow,
1956) or in traditional location models, the maximum income is achieved in
a dispersed equilibrium, the same one that we indicated in quadrant I as
”Best situation”, since it is optimal from a Paretian point of view.
When increasing returns are present, on the contrary, a number of models,
especially of the New Economic Geography (NEG, the most relevant for our
purposes of those will be mentioned in the next section) have outlined that
the equilibrium is more likely to be one with concurrent high income/growth
and high agglomeration, even if for some values of the parameters it is gener-
ally possible to have situations of high income/growth and low agglomeration,
or, and this is the worst case, situations in which regional disparities are high
despite of a low income/growth. For example Ottaviano and Thisse (2002)
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Figure 2: Classiﬁcation of the possible eﬀects of regional policies.
have identiﬁed a case of market failure in which, for intermediate transport
costs, the market outcome is the one of agglomeration, even if from a social
point of view dispersion would be desirable.
The theoretical developments of the last 15 years, therefore, have some-
what reversed the pattern of the most reasonable theoretical relationships
between growth and agglomeration, from one which saw the I and III quad-
rants as the most likely to occur to one in which the relationship is not linear
and it is also probable to ﬁnd the economy in the quadrants II and IV.
We would like to notice that the quadrants II and IV are not comparable
from a Paretian point of view, and this poses another problem to the pol-
icy maker, who, when allowed to pick up an equilibrium, may be facing a
trade-oﬀ between two desirable objectives.
The next step is therefore to build a 3 by 3 matrix in which to classify
regional policies (Fig. 2) according to their eﬀects on regional disparities and
on the eﬃciency of the aggregate economic system. Although 9 situations are
10theoretically possible, only 5 of them are indeed logical choices for the policy
maker. In fact, policies which have no eﬀect are not worthwhile, especially
when costly, and only a malevolent planner could chose to apply policies
whose eﬀects can be classiﬁed in quadrants IV, V and VI. Unfortunately,
even if not designed with that purpose, it is possible that, once implemented,
some policies have detrimental eﬀects, but this has to be considered an un-
intentional eﬀect and will not be discussed further.
The regional policies which can be with some reason implemented by a
benevolent planner are those of quadrants I, II, III, VII and VIII; there
may in fact be policies targeting the eﬃciency of the aggregate system, for
example when congestion dis-economies are present, and policies targeting
equity in space, either because this is considered a viable way to reduce
the diﬀerences of income across the population, or because in this way it is
possible to foster the ”cohesion” within a state or a supra-national body as
the EU.
The two objectives may be disjoint (policies belonging to quadrants II
and VIII) or can be targeted simultaneously by just one policy (quadrant
VI). The latter is the case of the EU Cohesion Policy, which tries to be a
mean to increase the cohesion of the Union by reducing regional disparities
and to allow a more balanced and, eventually, higher growth, as cited in the
3rd Cohesion Report:
”Strengthening regional competitiveness through well-targeted investment through-
out the Union and providing economic opportunities which help people fulﬁl
their capabilities will thus underpin the growth potential of the EU economy
as a whole to the common beneﬁt of all. By securing a more balanced spread
of economic activity across the Union, regional policy helps to reduce the pres-
sures of over-concentration, congestion and bottlenecks” (Commission, 2004,
11p. xxvi-xxvii).
Whether in the past the EU regional policy has been able to achieve these
objectives is still matter of an intense debate.
As obvious, the policies of quadrant I are the most diﬃcult to implement.
This is even more striking since, in presence of externalities, there exists a
trade oﬀ between growth and spatial dispersion, so that regional policies can
even fall into quadrants III and VII; this is the case of transport infras-
tructure between regions if the Core-Periphery model is worth: the result is
an increased agglomeration, which makes the inhabitants of the core region
richer at detriment of the poorer. Policies of types III and VII, despite of
the fact that they are not comparable from a Paretian point of view, can in
any case be implemented by a benevolent policy maker, but they need a po-
litical decision on which objective is superior to the other and, consequently,
a stronger political consensus.
For example, Davies and Hallet (2002) ﬁnd some evidence of a trade
oﬀ between national growth and regional dispersion in the case of Spain and
Ireland, even if, in non-Cohesion countries, they also ﬁnd evidence of a spread
eﬀect for which the reduction of regional disparities has induced a positive
eﬀect on growth.
The literature on trade, moreover, usually ﬁnds empirically that, with
trade getting freer, there is larger growth but national divergence.
At the same time, Paluzie (2001) showed with a three regional model (two
of which domestic) that, if trade becomes freer, regional disparities increase.
Unfortunately, the political deciders are not always aware of the possible
drawbacks of the policies they are going to implement. This problem is made
even more evident by the fact that the same policy can have very diﬀerent
results if applied to diﬀerent contexts, and too often the theory is insuﬃcient
12to distinguish among them.
One of the criticisms of Martin (1998b) to the New Economic Geography
theories resides in the fact that space is overly simpliﬁed and lacks of real-
ism, so that, with no insights about the speciﬁcity of territory, it is nearly
impossible to produce policy prescriptions. In this aspect some work has been
accomplished but much work is still needed, as also authors of NEG agree
and are trying to extend their models with the purpose of taking into account
a deeper description of spatial aspects (Ottaviano and Thisse, 2003).
4 Regional policy in growth, agglomeration
and public ﬁnance models
The spatial impossibility theorem (Starrett, 1978) aﬃrms that when trans-
port is costly and space is homogenous, then no equilibrium exists that in-
volves the movement of goods. For this reason (Thisse, 2000) when agglom-
eration exists, this is due to one or more of the following items: heterogenous
space; market externalities, either in production or in consumption; some
kind of non-competitive markets1. The market outcome will be optimal in
the ﬁrst case, but some interventions will be justiﬁed in the other two. In
particular Thisse (2000), using the model of Ottaviano et al. (2002) shows
that for high transport costs the equilibrium is a dispersed pattern and this
pattern is eﬃcient; the same happens for low transport costs, when the equi-
1Hurst et al. (2000) identify three main groups of possible market failures: the existence
of substantial technological externalities; the presence of pecuniary externalities, which
could lead to excessive agglomeration; the presence of a minimum threshold, so that either
new businesses need a minimun scale or a lack of adequate information on market and
production conditions may prevent new activities from implanting in a new area.
13librium and more eﬃcient pattern involves agglomeration. On the contrary,
when transport costs take intermediate values, there is more agglomeration
than eﬃcient.
The introduction of space, however, can also be used in order to achieve
perfect competition in models with increasing returns, as recently shown by
Berliant and ben Raa (2004), and this is a further proof that adding the
spatial dimension to economic models leads to important complications and,
even more important, to results that are highly dependent on the hypotheses.
The shipping of the goods does not constitute all of the transport costs:
diﬀerent customs, an imperfect knowledge of the market, ”quality” limits
to import, and even the exchange rate risk can be considered together; the
Euro, for example, can be thought of as an immaterial infrastructure able
to decrease the cost of moving goods across the continent by eliminating the
problems due to the use of diﬀerent currencies.
In many New Economic Geography models, moreover, the eﬀects of local
infrastructure are modelled by inserting iceberg transport costs as a wedge
between the production price and the consumer price of goods produced and
consumed locally.
Martin and Rogers (1995) develop a model of location with public infras-
tructures capable of leading to two important conclusions: ﬁrst that there is
some circular causation between the provision of infrastructure and agglom-
eration; in fact a state where there is more production generates more output
and consequently tax revenue that can be reinvested in more infrastructures
keeping these more advanced than that of a lagging country. This can be
also applied to regions if there is some sort of ﬁscal federalism or if the na-
tion state allocates its resources taking into account the revenue that it gets
from the various regions. The second conclusion arising from the model is
14that there is a big diﬀerence of results between infrastructure that facilitate
domestic trade and those that facilitate the international one. The former
leads to an increase in eﬃciency and production of the domestic area; the
latter in most cases leads to larger aggregate economic production but also
to greater agglomeration at detriment of the less advantaged region. As in
generally all the new economic geography models, the space scale is not really
speciﬁed and so the model can be used between nations at a European level
or between regions at a country level.
The model is innovative, but the distinction between these types of trans-
port infrastructures were already known in the literature since Wickerman
(1991a) pointed out the distinction between three types: those that use the
region as a pure corridor (as it is the case of an high speed railways without
stops), those that interconnect the region with other regions and those that
improve mobility within the region; the ﬁrst have in general no direct eﬀects
but may have indirect eﬀects, often negative for the region crossed (and,
obviously, positive for the terminals of the network); the second’s eﬀect is
ambiguous (but most models of new economic geography seems to incline to
say that in most cases it will favour the agglomerated regions and hamper the
lagging ones); the eﬀect of the last are always positive at a regional level, even
if they have to be compared with the costs of setting up the infrastructure.
Philippe Martin (1998a, 1999b,a, 2000), following his work of 1995, is the
author than most explicitly has addressed the issue of eﬃciency and equity of
regional policies. In the ﬁrst of these contributions Martin (1998a) he ques-
tioned the linearity of the relationship between growth and localisation, and
using a model of Martin and Ottaviano (1996, 1999), evidenced the possibil-
ity that higher agglomeration and higher growth coincide.
In the second article Martin (1999b), using a model with both growth and
15agglomeration, he achieved the conclusions that there exists a trade-oﬀ be-
tween growth and an even spatial distribution of economic activities, showing
that the eﬀects of an increment of infrastructure that ease the commerce of
goods within a poor region are: a lower concentration of industries, a lower
growth rate and, un-intuitively, an increase in the income gap between the
regions. On the opposite, infrastructure that decreases trasport costs between
regions increase agglomeration, increase growth and decrease nominal income
disparities, but with an ambiguous eﬀect on real disparities since the impact
on the price index of the regions is complex. The policies that increase the
rate of innovation, ﬁnally, have a win-win eﬀect, since they both increase the
growth rate and reduce regional disparities.
In the third article Martin (1999a), using the theoretical conclusions of the
second, shows that, in the light of the trade oﬀ growth-equality, the EU will
need to re-deﬁne its policy objectives, in particular that market failures have
to be identiﬁed and have to be the basic target of policies; the paper also
supports policies that try to make easier communication and the transfers
of innovation across space; the author also supports that with policies that
increase the mobility of workers regional income disparities should decrease,
a conclusion which is shared by Puga (2002) and Hurst et al. (2000), even if
recently (Fratesi and Riggi, 2004) it has been evidenced that the eﬀects of
workers’ mobility are not necessarily straightforward.
The conclusions about regional policy achieved in the New Economic Ge-
ography literature have been with eﬃcacy synthesized in the book of Baldwin
et al. (2003), mainly using an extended version of the ”localised spillovers”
model developed by Martin (1998a, 1999b); the book models as intra-regional
and inter-regional trade costs many features which include infrastructure but
not only; in this way the authors are able to discuss the eﬀects of a number
16of regional policies.
The ﬁrst policy experiment is a continuous transfer of income from the north
to the south2 which lowers income inequality and spatial concentration, but
also lowers the growth rate of the whole country. As already evidenced by
the original article (Martin, 1999b) an infrastructure that facilitates intra-
regional trade in the south lowers agglomeration, lowers aggregate growth
and increases nominal income inequality both between regions and between
workers and capital owners. Infrastructure that decreases inter-regional trans-
port costs increases growth and spatial concentration, and decreases nominal
income inequalities again both between regions and between workers and
capital owners. Policies that facilitate technology spillovers across regional
boundaries increase growth in the whole economy, decrease spatial concentra-
tion and decrease nominal inequalities between regions and between workers
and capital owners.
In the context of a three-regional country they then obtain the interesting
result that, if the central region is the poorest, decreasing transport costs
lead to a re-location of economic activities towards the central region pro-
vided that its share of Expenditure is suﬃciently high.
They then introduce congestion costs and show how, in this case, lower trans-
port costs between regions may put the economy in an equilibrium with low
growth, high spatial concentration and high regional income inequality, the
worst equilibrium of Fig. 1.
Finally, their analysis is extended to show how infrastructure improvements
have non linear eﬀects, in particular an improvement of infrastructure within
2Also in this case, as in nearly all two-regional models, the North is used to indicate
the advanced (agglomeration) region and the South the lagging one, as it is used in the
literature about asymmetric models of trade and growth (Chui et al., 2002).
17the poorer region may have no eﬀect at all until a certain threshold is reached
and, then, convergence suddenly occurs between the two regions.
Lanaspa and Sanz (2004) further extend the model of Martin and Rogers
(1995) in order to consider that infrastructure can have diﬀerential eﬀects
on imports and exports. They chose to classify a large number of infras-
tructure (and, hence, of policy interventions) into 4 types, depending if they
are domestic or international and if they aﬀect import or export costs; the
results they get with the model is that the most eﬀective policy for a re-
gion interested in attracting more industry is to improve its domestic and
international export infrastructure, whilst the investment in transport or in-
ternational import infrastructure does not have a clear eﬀect. Concerning
welfare, attracting industries always increase welfare, even if at detriment of
the other region. Their analysis, in fact, does not focus on general welfare
implications.
In a previous contributions, the same authors (Lanaspa et al., 2001) ex-
tended the core-periphery model (Krugman, 1991b) to include a public sec-
tor, getting the result that regions with a lower tax burden or with an higher
eﬃciency of the public sector are generally more attractive to ﬁrms’ location;
the other eﬀect they observe is that the inﬂuence of transport costs becomes
dependent on the size of the public sector so that the relationship between
these costs and agglomeration is no longer monotonous as in the original C-P
model.
An envisaged development regards the analysis of regional policy in mod-
els which explicilty intruduce non-traded goods in the economy as in Behrens
(2004) who, using and extension of the model by Ottaviano et al. (2002) show
that more complex spatial structures emerge, in particular that partial ag-
glomeration is possible. Other interesting aspects to investigate are the scope
18and eﬀects of regional policy in models which introduce taste heterogeneities
in the line of probabilistic migration theories, like the one of Murata (2003),
or in models that introduce asymmetries in the regions, such as Lanaspa and
Sanz (1999) who use diﬀerent agricultural populations in the C-P model as
a proxy of heterogeneous quality of land, or in models in which congestion is
possible (Lanaspa and Sanz, 2001).
Ottaviano (2003) lists the general policy implications of New Economic
Geography models: ﬁrst all policies (tax, competition, trade, etc.) usually
have spatial eﬀects, and these eﬀects should be taken into account; second,
the impact of regional policies is highly dependent on the extent of trade
integration, in general the eﬀect is more important when barriers are lower
and goods and capital are more footloose; third there exist threshold eﬀects,
since policies can have no eﬀect until a threshold is reached and, then, the
eﬀect is catastrophic; on the other side, due to the existence of the lock-in,
temporary policies can have permanent eﬀects due to locational hysteresis
and self reinforcing mechanisms; ﬁnally, policies can be very eﬀective when
they act as a selection mechanism able to lead the economic system towards
the desirable equilibrium, if the starting point is not a stable equilibrium.
An important theme in regional integration and policy, which is increas-
ingly integrated into agglomeration models, is ﬁscal competition (see the
work of Wildasin (2003) for a recent and encompassing model): regions can
compete by decreasing taxes in order to attract ﬁrms and, in this way, in-
crease their welfare at the other region’s expenses; unfortunately this may
lead to a ”race to the bottom”, and regional authorities end up by decreasing
taxes or giving subsidies to ﬁrms up to a level which is no longer justiﬁable
in economic terms: this is known as Tiebout mechanism. One way of coming
out of this has been identiﬁed by Justman et al. (2001) in the regional diﬀer-
19entiation of the quality of infrastructure, if there is enough diﬀerentiation of
ﬁrms, so that each region would provide and be paid for a certain quality of
infrastructure, which a group of ﬁrms chooses as its better compromise and
consequent location. Another factor lowering ﬁscal competition (Bjorvatan
and Schjelderup, 2002) is the presence of international spillovers of locally
provided public goods, which are unfortunately not able to induce the ﬁrst
best outcome because there is then a problem of free riding among regions.
Moreover, they show that congestion can lead to an under-provision of public
goods.
Finally, Ludema and Wooton (2000) show that, contrary to the most dif-
fused belief, regional integration can decrease the intensity of tax competi-
tion, restoring rather than eroding ﬁscal autonomy; this happens, in economic
geography models, especially when agglomeration forces are high.
In a recent paper, Dupont and Martin (2003) study the eﬀects of a number
of subsidies to mobile ﬁrms as a form of regional policy, and get an unpleasant
conclusion: since it is the core who owns more capital, such subsidies, even
if ﬁnanced at national level and introduced in the poor region, may increase
inequality.
5 Regional policy in a two countries four re-
gions model
In this section we will present a model inspired by models of growth with
public policy (in the line of Barro (1990), Rebelo (1991), Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1992)) and models of agglomeration, as outlined in the previous sec-
tion. The model explicitly introduces a 2-country 4-regions framework, with
the purpose to investigate in what stages of development regional policies
20with productive targets are more appropriate than income transfers across
regions.
A previous work with 4 regions, although implicit, was the one of Casella
(2002), who, using a model derived from the one of Ciccone and Hall (1996),
introduced the possibility of having two countries and two regions not co-
inciding. The model of Casella, in fact, was inspired by the EU situation,
where poor regions tend to be the most peripheral. Her idea, therefore, is to
have a core and a periphery, and two countries each of which encompassing
part of the core and part of the periphery. She concludes that the optimal
policy requires both national and international transfers. The only case in
which the single countries policies can achieve eﬃciency, in fact, is when the
mobility of workers if full across borders.
[The model will be presented directly at the conference]
[Insert model and solutions here]
216 Conclusions
The literature survey has evidenced that, despite signiﬁcant advancements,
the introduction of regional policy into models of growth and/or agglomera-
tion still has a long way to do.
In particular, regional policies in economic models are usually analysed
for their change in equilibria. This is clearly a limit, since adjustment is
viscous, and many interventions act at a point in space where equilibrium
has not been reached.
Then, there is the fact that regional policy is costly; for example it is
expensive to reduce the transport costs between two regions, due to the large
infrastructural investments needed; many authors never explicitly consider
the cost of policies, with some exceptions, like Martin (1999b) who states that
to have costly policies does not aﬀects the main conclusions of his model.
Another aspect is the fact that nearly all modelled regional policy regards
infrastructure (Dupont and Martin, 2003, is an exception) and the fact that
infrastructure is most times considered as a mean of exchange of goods,
even if in the real world there exist infrastructure for a large number of
purposes: helping production, supporting innovation, increasing the skill level
of citizens, increasing the amenity level of the region, etc.
The model of section 5 has shown some eﬀects of regional policies in a
context of competing countries, each of them made by more than a region.
In particular it evidenced that, when infrastructure is a factor of production,
there exist stages of development in which the optimal strategy for a country
becomes to concentrate the productive capability into one region and give
the other region only income transfers.
This has historically happened in a number of cases; a striking example is
the one of the Italian Mezzogiorno, where, in the years of economic boom for
22the country, the South has gained much more in terms of ability to consume
than in productive capability. After the ”Autunno Caldo” of 1969 (Boltho
et al., 1997) the nominal wages have become more similar across the country
and, added to the standing gap in infrastructures and services (Conﬁndustria,
2000) this has contributed to the lack of inward investment.
What is remarkable, though, is that the movements of population from
north to south has nearly stopped after the mid-70’s, and this despite the
huge diﬀerence in unemployment rates. Attanasio and Padoa Schioppa (1991)
found 5 concurring causes that increase the cost of moving: the fact that
women are now in a larger number on the labour market makes it more
diﬃcult to relocate because of the need to ﬁnd 2 jobs instead of one; the dif-
ferences in the prices of basic facilities, especially housing; labour laws that
make very diﬃcult ﬁring and hiring; the aggregate unemployment rate that
may aﬀect the gains from migration; lastly, even the fact that after some
years of low migration the mobility is more diﬃcult, possibly because of the
loosening of ties useful to relocate. In addition to the increasing costs they
indicate two other causes for the drop in migration, very relevant fro our pur-
poses: the decrease in interregional real wage diﬀerentials and the rise in the
government transfers to the south, that allows the so called ”wait unemploy-
ment” of young people that can rely on familiy support. Faini et al. (1997),
however, criticise this last point and ﬁnd that higher household income make
it easier to ﬁnance the cost of migration; their favourite explanation is a
combination of demographic factors, high mobility costs and a job searching
process that in Italy is publicly managed and highly ineﬃcient (even if some
reform is under way).
As Lombardini (1992) points out, an eﬃcient industrial policy has never
been set up, instead all the policy has been developed in an assistantial
23manner and the south has developed only as a big market for the north
products. The hoped-for movements of northern entrepreneurs to the south
has not occurred in the 50’s and 60’s, when the labour cost in the south
was consistently lower than in the north, because of the lack of reliability of
the public administrations in granting basic services, infrastructures and even
security from crime. Instead many skilled southerners have moved northwards
together with unskilled workforce that has contributed with cheap labour to
the ”Italian Miracle” of these decades.
Today the GDP of the South is around 54 % of the one of the North but
consumption is much more levelled at country level, since the Mezzogiorno
is about at 72% of the Northern value.
This development pattern has always been interpreted negatively by all
commenters, for example Alesina et al. (1999) measure that half of the public
wage bill in the south can be deﬁned as a subsidy, given the size of the public
employment and the wage premium for public jobs with respect to private
ones. They also ﬁnd that this form of subsidy has very negative eﬀects since
it creates a dependency equilibrium in which private jobs are not attractive
and it becomes diﬃcult for an entrepreneur to oﬀer wages competitive with
the ones in the public administrations.
Some similarities and some diﬀerences exist with East-Germany case:
according to Boltho et al. (1997), after re-uniﬁcation, former DDR has expe-
rienced a high raise in nominal wages (from 10 to 70% of West Germany) and
transfers, but the outcomes should be diﬀerent from the Italian case since the
wage diﬀerential remains consistent enough for competitiveness, the invest-
ment rate is very high and, very important, East Germany has a tradition
of entrepreneurship (it was the most advanced part of the country before
WWII) and prosperity that should avoid it to be entangled in dependency
24and rent-seeking behaviours.
Sinn and Westermann (2001), in addition to striking similarities in term
of artiﬁcially low wage diﬀerential, dependency on transfers, locational disad-
vantages, also ﬁnd that the level of investment in East-Germany is decreasing,
that wages are still higher than productivity and even that ”It is impossible
to run a market economy where the minimum income guaranteed through
the welfare system is equal to the average net-of-tax wage income” (Sinn
and Westermann, 2001, p. 23); as a consequence the process of convergence
between the two Germanys, substantial until 1996, has halted in 1997. The
solution they propose is decentralised wage bargaining, leaner welfare state
to avoid the crowding out of the private labour market, transfers through
infrastructure investment instead of social support.
Unfortunately we are not able at this stage to assess if one of these cases
(for example Italy in the 50’s and 60’s) has to be considered a case in which
giving immediately to the lagging regions an increased spending power has
proved more eﬃcient for the whole country than giving it productive infras-
tructure. However, we cannot a-priori exclude it, even if this issue would
deserve an ad hoc analysis, that it is not possible to run in this paper.
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